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I provide an account of feeling revengeful and I do so while rejecting the view that anger is ‘the emotion’ of revenge and that to be angry, conceptually, is to have a desire for vengeance. My aim is to challenge us to see the complex dimensions of revenge as feeling(s), which will also disprove the above views. I also make a case for precision in the ways we describe our affective states and trouble the tendency to necessarily link anger to revenge, anger’s action tendency to vengeance, and view angry people as ‘the avengers.’

"Raging better: Reflections on the Myisha Cherry's The Case for Rage" by Alice MacLachlan

"The Rage We Should Have" by Lidal Dror

"Expressing and Receiving Negative Emotions" by Nic Bommarito

"The Nature and Normativity of Anger Types" by Myisha Cherry

 

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I examine how James Baldwin explored white ignorance—as conceived by Charles Mills—in his work. I argue that Baldwin helps us understand Mills’s account of white ignorance more deeply, showing that while only mentioned briefly by Mills, Baldwin provides fruitful insights into the phenomenon. I also consider the resources Baldwin provides to find a way out of white ignorance. My aim is to link these thinkers in ways that have been largely ignored.

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In this brief essay, I sketch out the philosophical landscape considering anger in general, and political anger in particular. I begin by sketching anger's profile and its relation to judgments. I also consider the role anger plays in moral life. I then consider how philosophers have conceived of political anger, particularly anger that arises in a context of oppression. I survey claims in support of anger's value, as well as debates around its counterproductivity. And I suggest that debates can benefit from taking seriously different species of anger, and the injustices and burdens that are implicit in our forswearing, eradication, or moderation recommendations. I conclude with reflections on recent research and suggestions for future research.

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This article introduces a concept that I refer to as racialized forgiveness. Cases that exemplify certain conditions that I take as paradigmatic of the problem of racialized forgiveness include instances in which: (a) who is forgiven or not is determined by the race of the offender; (b) praise and criticisms of forgiveness are determined by the race of the victim; and (c) praise and criticisms of forgiveness are, at least implicitly, racially self-serving. I argue that this practice is morally objectionable because of its psychological origins, moral failures, and negative effects. Accordingly, in order to dodge these pitfalls, we need to practice forgiveness differently.

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What I aim to elucidate in this article is Baldwin’s moral psychology of anger in general, and black rage in particular, as seen in his nonfiction. I’ll show that Baldwin’s thinking is significant for moral psychology and is relevant to important questions at the intersection of philosophy of emotions, race, and social philosophy. It also has pragmatic application to present-day anti-racist struggle. Baldwin’s theoretical account of Black rage, I’ll argue, (1) dignifies Blacks by centering them as people with agential capacities and (2) provides them with a pragmatic politics of rage that is useful in the fight against white supremacy and racial injustice.

Gendered Failures in Extrinsic Emotional Regulation; Or, Why Telling a Woman to “Relax” or a Young Boy to “Stop Crying Like a Girl” Is Not a Good Idea

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I argue that gendered stereotypes, gendered emotions and attitudes, and display rules can influence extrinsic regulation stages, making failure points likely to occur in gendered-context and for reasons that the emotion regulation literature has not given adequate attention to. As a result, I argue for ‘feminist emotional intelligence’ as a way to help escape these failures. Feminist emotional intelligence, on my view, is a nonideal ability-based approach that equips a person to effectively reason about emotions through an intersectional lens and use emotions to inform how we think and react to the world. This includes being attuned to the ways in which the world and our emotional lives are structured by and favors men. It stresses the need to be attuned to, as well as resist and challenge gender-based stereotypes and attitudes around emotions, paying close attention to the ways those stereotypes, norms, and attitudes differ across race, class, ethnicity, et cetera.

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Samuel Fleischacker is interested in two questions that are—what he
refers to as—a rephrasing of three implications Charles Mills takes away from his
encounter with Kant: (1) Is Kant’s moral philosophy racist at its core? and (2)
Whether it is or not, how should we respond to the fact that Kant displays open
racism in some of his writings when we study, teach, or try to make use of his purportedly egalitarian teachings? Frederick Douglass was an abolitionist who wrestled with similar questions regarding the liberatory and inclusive nature of emancipatory documents like the Constitution. In this essay, I want to consider Douglass’s changing views on this issue and reasons behind them to think about how he might offer insights into this current debate concerning Kant and race. In doing so, I will consider to what extent Fleischacker adheres to Douglass’s guidelines on this matter as he makes his case. I then offer suggestions on how to move forward.

 

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I examine the possibility of civic friendship to solve the problem of over-doing democracy, paying close attention to how it can counter affective polarization and social homogeneity. In Section I, I explore civic friendship as a solution to polarization. In section II, I argue that Talisse’s civic friendship—in the context of nonpolitical collaboration—is akin to Aristotle’s utility and plea- sure-friendships. Given the nature of civic friendship, in Section III–VI I make amendments to Talisse’s proposal. I argue that if civic friendship is to address not only desaturation but polarization, and it has these Aristotelian features, then the cultivation of taste, equity, and ethical attentiveness are necessary.

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When bringing philosophical attention to bear on social movement slogans in general, philosophers have often focused on their communicative nature—particularly the hermeneutical failures that arise in discourse. Some of the most popular of these failures are illustrated in ‘all lives matter’ retorts to ‘black lives matter’ pronouncements. Although highlighting and criticizing these failures provides much needed insight into social movement slogans as a communicative practice, I claim that in doing so, philosophers and slogans’ users risk placing too much importance on outgroup understandings. This emphasis is misguided because gaining such uptake is not required of particular slogans to perform their functions; indeed it is an inherent risk of them. I show how such an emphasis can also be distracting to users. Since social movement slogans that express values are first and foremost for users, I argue for a shift in focus in what these slogans (such as ‘Black Is Beautiful’ and the more recent ‘Black Lives Matter’) do for users, as well as what they demand from users and enable them to express. When slogans have done these things, regardless of uptake, we can say they have performed one of their key functions.

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Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backward-looking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston Church shooting, Gandhi, and King, she claims that we should choose love instead of anger – not only in our intimate relationships but also in the political realm. Buddhist monk and scholar, Śāntideva, argued that anger is an obstacle to love. Anger leads to suffering. Love frees us from suffering. All this makes an initially compelling case against anger at racial injustice. In addition, although philosophers Jeffrie Murphy and Antti Kauppinen argue that anger communicates self-respect and valuing, respectively––they make no connection between agape love and anger. In this essay I’ll show that the love King and others have in mind––agape love––is not only compatible with anger at hateful racists and complicit others, but finds valuable expression in such anger.

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Being aware of social injustices can cause existential and mental pain; comes with a burden; and may impede a flourishing life. However, I shall argue that this is not a reason to despair or to choose to be willfully ignorant. Rather, it’s a reason to conclude that being conscious is not enough. Rather, during times of oppression, resisters must also prioritize well-being. One way to do this is by extending what I refer to as solidarity care. I begin by providing an account of solidarity care. I then offer pragmatic ways in which one can extend solidarity care to others. I conclude by responding to two possible worries

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While anger in sports has been explored in philosophy, the phenomenon known as having a ‘chipped shoulder’ (or CSP) has not. In this paper, I explore the nature, causes, and effects of playing with a ‘chip on your shoulder’ in order to highlight the interplay between resentment, motivation, and performance. CSP, on my account, involves a lasting grudge, controlled anger, and desire for non-moral payback at being overlooked, slighted, or underestimated in sports presently or at one point in one’s career. I argue that CSP can motivate and thus enhance athletic performance. I also show how athletes can and should have a chipped shoulder forever.

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In this chapter, I argue that while moral exemplars are useful, we must be careful in our use of them. I first describe forgiveness exemplars that are often used to persuade victims to forgive such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Jr., and Jesus of Nazareth. I also explain how, for Kant, highlighting these figures as moral exemplars can be useful. I then explain two kinds of rhetorical strategies that are used when attempting to convince victims to forgive. Last, I explain (a la Kant) how the use of exemplars does not empower but instead disempowers victims. My overall claim is that using exemplars to persuade victims to forgive is problematic. It is best if we rely on decisive reasons to forgive instead of focusing on people who have forgiven.

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(I argue: A particular kind of anger at racial injustice is necessary in anti-racist struggle—but that does not mean anger cannot go wrong.)

Anger looms large in our public lives. Should it?

The contributions that follow Agnes Callard's leading essay explore anger in its many forms—public and private, personal and political—raising an issue that we must grapple with: Does the vast well of public anger compromise us all?

FORUM

Lead essay by Agnes Callard. Responses by Paul Bloom, Elizabeth Bruenig, Desmond Jagmohan, Daryl Cameron & Victoria Spring, Myisha Cherry, Jesse Prinz, Rachel Achs, Barbara Herman, Oded Na’aman. Final response by Agnes Callard.

ESSAYS

Judith Butler interviewed by Brandon M. Terry, David Konstan, Martha C. Nussbaum, Whitney Phillips, Amy Olberding.

(The Errors and Limitations of our Anger Evaluating Ways) 
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In this chapter I will give an account of how our judgments of anger often play out in different instances. While contemporary philosophers of emotion have provided us with check box guides like “fittingness” and “size” for evaluating anger, I will argue that these guides do not by themselves help us escape the tendency to mark or unmark the boxes selectively, inconsistently, and erroneously. If anger—particularly anger in a political context—can provide information and spark positive change or political destruction, then we have moral reasons to evaluate it properly. But can we? And what are the limitations and errors we often face when evaluating anger?

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My chapter examines how criminal justice policies, and laws are a hidden form of anti-black racism. In other words, I will examine how state racism and state violence is sustained. I will also explore how the law creates a “subRace” out of those society fears and have contempt for. This not only leaves black Americans vulnerable but it also transforms those who are different or new (transgender, mentally ill, the undocumented, and the poor) into the “new black”, a group who like their black counterparts, will remain marginalized as a fact of law. In doing so, I aim to show that a way to fight this form of racism is to not only create a solidarity among the oppressed members of the subRace but to also take a proactive approach toward the law and the criminal justice system. This entails a reimagining of what 21st century political power must look like for Black, Brown, and other oppressed bodies.

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The Medusa trope depicts women who are angry as having no real reason for being angry since, more often than not, they are not really victims. It also depicts such angry women as dangerous, and society concludes that these angry, blameworthy women must be conquered and controlled through patriarchal norms, laws, expectations, and hostility. I describe the reality of such a trope for many women and girls. I then discuss some implications of it, particularly the urge for women and girls to escape features of the trope in order to escape being conquered and controlled. I also wonder to what extent it is possible to escape the trope, and I offer some reasons for why women should not escape it, even if they could. I conclude by arguing why and how women and girls can embrace the Medusa trope as a form of resistance against sexism and misogyny.

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In Entangled Empathy, Lori Gruen offers an alternative ethic for our relationships with animals. In this article, I examine Gruen’s account of entangled empathy by first focusing on entangled empathy’s relation to the moral emotions of sympathy, compassion, and other emotions. I then challenge Gruen’s account of how entangled empathy moves us to attend to others. Lastly, and without intending to place humans at the center of the conversation, I reflect on the ways entangled empathy can help us solve some human problems—particularly the racial divide in the United States.

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In response to Zack’s “White Priviledge and Black Rights”, I consider her account of the hunting schema in light of police violence against black women. I argue that although Zack provides us with a compelling account of racial profiling and police brutality, the emotional aspect she attributes to the hunting schema is too charitable. I then claim that Zack’s hunting schema fails to account for state violence against black women and in doing so she only tells a partial story of comparative injustice as it relates to police brutality of blacks.

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To Shape a New World, edited by Tommie Shelby and Brandon Terry, is a gift. It’s a gift to teachers who feel that there is so much more to Martin Luther King, Jr. than his dream but have been puzzled by how to incorporate him in their classrooms. Due to syllabi constraints, pedagogical rules, and canonical exclusionary practices—particularly in philosophy—teachers who are able to teach King’s work often find that the only way of doing so is to put him in conversation with Socrates. This conversation about civil disobedience creates a spot for King’s ‘Letter from a Birmingham Jail’ alongside Plato’s ‘Crito’. However, the course often goes on without any mention of King and his other theoretical contributions. This volume is a solution to that problem. It gives us reasons to incorporate King in philosophy and political theory courses in ways that go beyond the civil disobedience debate. More importantly, it makes us question how in the world we could have ignored King’s philosophical thought as much as we have in any course focused on examining our political and social world.

This volume is also a gift for...

 

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I provide three types of dialogue found in everyday life. I then show how the latter dialogical model is ideal for public philosophical engagement. I refer to it as ‘liberatory dialogue’—a theoretical framework that shapes my public philosophy practice and provides invaluable benefits. In liberatory dialogue, characters are subjects, active, teachers and students, creative and critical, and collaborative. Influenced by the work of Paulo Freire, I argue that knowledge, mutual humanization, and liberation are some of the benefits that liberatory dialogue provides. I then highlight several ways in which I incorporate liberatory dialogue in my work as well as some of the challenges of doing so.

 

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I claim that professional philosophers need to seriously rethink how they do philosophy, where they do philosophy, and with whom they do philosophy. My suggestion is that they “leave the shade” of their philosophical bubbles by making their work accessible to each other and to the public and by engaging with thinkers outside of philosophy. I argue that if philosophers do not “leave the shade,” we may witness the decline and even the eradication of the field of philosophy, as we know it.

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This research note is meant to introduce into philosophical discussion the preliminary results of an empirical study on the state of blacks in philosophy, which is a joint effort of the American Philosophical Association’s Committee on the Status of Black Philosophers (APA CSBP) and the Society of Young Black Philosophers (SYBP). The study is intended to settle factual issues in furtherance of contributing to dialogues surrounding at least two philosophical questions: What, if anything, is the philosophical value of demographic diversity in professional philosophy? And what is philosophy? The empirical goals of the study are (1) to identify and enumerate U.S. blacks in philosophy, (2) to determine the distribution of blacks in philosophy across career stages, (3) to determine correlates to the success of blacks in philosophy at different career stages, and (4) to compare and contrast results internally and externally to explain any career stage gaps and determine any other disparities.

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In this chapter, mixed with moral psychology and ethics, I explore the topic of manipulation by analyzing “Orange Is The New Black” season two antagonist, Yvonne “Vee” Parker. I claim that Vee is a master manipulator. I begin by laying out several definitions and features of manipulation. Definitions include covert influence, non-rational influence, the effect of non-rational influence, and intentionally making someone or altering a situation to make someone succumb to weaknesses. Features include trust, deception, emotion, false belief, and vulnerability. I argue that although philosophers (Anne Barnhill, Robert Noggle, and Colin McGinn) are divided on what manipulation is because not all definitions and features fit all cases, I claim that Vee’s actions fit them all. I then attempt to explore what is bad and possibly good about manipulation. I examine if excellence alone is what makes manipulation good or should we take into consideration the autonomy denied the listener, the vices employed, and the bad consequences that arise from manipulation. I conclude with offering up suggestions on how one can guard themselves against manipulators.

In The Wire and Philosophy selected philosophers who are fans of The Wire tap into these conflicts and interconnections to expose the underlying philosophical issues and assumptions and pursue questions. In “Stop Snitching, Stop the System,” I argue that law abiding citizens do not cooperate with the police because of the rampant state violence they witness and the police’s blatant disregard for their lives. I argue that the refusal of law abiding citizens to snitch to the police against neighborhood criminals is ‘non-cooperation’ and this non-cooperation is an act of political resistance.

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Comedian Louis C.K. brilliantly reveals to us the reality of race, racism, and privilege–from a white male perspective, under the genius of comedic rhetoric, perfect timing, and societal truth. Instead of sounding like he is trying too hard to be an ally to blacks, or an anti-racist whose mission is to transfer white guilt to his white audience, Louis’s comedy instead, makes us laugh, but makes us think and see at the same time. In this chapter, I provide a descriptive analysis of Louis C.K.’s account of privilege. I then argue that he leaves the prescriptive account– the what to do about white privilege and how to do it- up to us.

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When we find ourselves arguing with another person face-to-face, we can generally rest assured that our conflict won’t rise beyond a certain threshold. But what happens to such restraint when our arguments go online? Under the Web’s protective cloak of anonymity, many speak to others in ways that mislead, mock and malign. Taking aim at one of the key examples of this trend, I share my thoughts about the growing threat of “Twitter trolling.”